

## Message Text

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ORIGIN PM-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 ACDA-19 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 DODE-00 SS-15

NSC-10 IO-13 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 /138 R

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8/8/73 EXT 21149

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S/S - MR. BARNES

OJCS/J-5 - BGEN. GEORGI(INFORMED)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 157092

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/79

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 9 SPC AND ROLE OF MBFR  
WORKING GROUP

REF: USNATO 3732 AND USNATO 3733

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST (USNATO 3732) FOR  
GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 9 SPC MEETING, WE WOULD SUPPORT FRG  
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WORK PROGRAM WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT (A) MAXIMUM  
USE BE MADE OF EXISTING WORK E.G. US OTHER ALLIES AND WG  
HAVE PREPARED MANY PAPERS ON ISSUES SUCH AS "YARD STICKS",  
ASYMMETRIES, DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT, ETC; (B) WE WILL

HAVE FURTHER VIEWS ON SCOPE AND THRUST OF WG ACTIVITIES;  
(C) BOTH SPC AND WG WILL ADDRESS SUBJECTS RAISED IN  
WORK PROGRAM. WE DO NOT WISH TO RELEGATE ISSUES OF THIS  
SCOPE TO THE SOLE ADDRESSAL OF WG AND BELIEVE SPC SHOULD  
REVIEW CLOSELY TO INSURE REQUISIT POLITICAL AS WELL AS  
MILITARY CONSIDERATION. YOU MAY MAKE FOLLOWING  
SPECIFIC POINTS RE FRG PROPOSED WORK PROGRAM AND UK PAPER  
ON MEASURING COMBAT CAPABILITY:

--IF DATA ISSUE RAISED YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT SPC WORK  
ON MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS CANNOT DEPEND ON LONGER TERM  
PROJECTS UNDERWAY IN WORKING GROUP. DATA BASE PROJECT IS  
CASE IN POINT. IT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL FOR DATA SUBGROUP  
TO IDENTIFY MORE LIMITED STATISTICAL REQUIREMENTS SUITABLE  
FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN TO CONCENTRATE ON MORE  
ELABORATE FORMS NECESSARY FOR ANALYSIS, AN ESSENTIALLY  
SUBSIDIARY TASK. MORE DETAILED GUIDANCE ON DATA PROBLEM  
IS IN PREPARATION.

--WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUGGESTED THAT ALL AVAILABLE  
METHODS BE USED TO JUDGE EFFECTS OF MBFR AGREEMENTS AND  
THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO RELY ON ONE METHOD ABOVE ANY  
OTHER. IN THIS REGARD WE SHOULD NOT OPPOSE HAVING UK PAPER  
ON COMBAT CAPABILITY ADDRESSED BY MBFR WORKING GROUP.

2. BEGIN FYI. WE WOULD PLAN TO CHALLENGE THE SUBSTANCE OF  
THE UK PAPER EXTENSIVELY IN THE WORKING GROUP. IN THIS  
CONNECTION, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT COMBAT CAPABILITY CONCEPTS  
TO BE DISCUSSED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COULD NOT AGREE TO ANY  
PROCEDURE SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA 11 OF UK PAPER.  
YOU MAY RECALL THAT ALLIES HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP  
AN AGREED YARDSTICK FOR ALMOST FOUR YEARS, IN ANALYTICAL  
FRAMEWORK, WITHOUT SUCCESS. THEREFORE QUESTION OF USING AS  
YET UNAGREED YARDSTICK FOR NEGOTIATION WITH WARSAW PACT OR  
FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES DOES NOT RISE UNTIL  
ALLIANCE HAS AGREED ON HOW COMBAT CAPABILITY CAN BE MEASUR-  
ED. THESE POINTS SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THOMPSON. END FYI.  
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3. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SPC CONCEN-  
TRATING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSI-  
TION FOR NAC CONSIDERATION NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 7. IN  
DOING SO THE SPC SHOULD CONSTANTLY BEAR IN MIND THAT THE  
CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE MBFR POSITION MUST BE A  
REDUCTION PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD REINFORCE, WHERE  
POSSIBLE, SPC AUGUST 7 RECOGNITION OF NEED TO CONCENTRATE  
ON SECTION 2 OF US MANDATE.

4. IN ANY EVENT, IF SPC IS TO FINISH THE ASSIGNMENT GIVEN  
IT BY THE NAC BY EARLY SEPTEMBER IT CANNOT ALLOW ITSELF  
TO BE DISTRACTED BY LESS IMMEDIATE TASKS.

5. IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DISCUSSION IN NAC AND SPC, WE HAVE GENERALLY CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP AND HOW IT MIGHT BEST BE DEVELOPED WITHIN NATO. NO CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS (PARAS 6-11) AND THEY ARE PRESENTED BELOW FOR MISSIONS CONSIDERATION AND COMMENT.

6. IT IS PROBABLE THAT LARGER ISSUE OF WORKING GROUP ROLE CAN BEST BE TACKLED IF IT IS HANDLED GRADUALLY AND INFORMALLY, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER BEARING ON ALLIANCE CONDUCT OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN AS QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ALLIANCE TO ARRIVE AT WORKABLE CONCEPT OF

PROPER WG ROLE AND MODE OF FUNCTIONING BEFORE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, PRECISELY IN ORDER TO AVOID CONTINUOUS FRICTION OVER SECONDARY INSTITUTIONAL ISSUE OF THIS SORT DURING PROCESS WHERE ALLIED COHESION WILL BE NEEDED.

7. WITH SOME OTHER ALLIES, WE CONSIDER THAT A MAJOR WEAKNESS OF WG IN PAST HAS BEEN ITS TENDENCY TO DEVELOP ITS OWN WORK PROGRAM AND TO CONSIDER ITS PRODUCTS TO BE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS RATHER THAN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. SO LONG AS ALLIANCE WAS NOT FACED WITH ACTUAL MBFR NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THIS SITUATION COULD BE KEPT WITHIN BOUNDS AT LITTLE REAL COST, WHILE WG ACTIVITIES HAD SECONDARY ADVANTAGE OF PROVIDING SOME BASIS TO SATISFY PSYCHOLOGICAL CONFIDENTIAL

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INTEREST OF SMALLER COUNTRIES FOR PARTICIPATION IN MBFR PREPARATIONS. AS ALLIANCE APPROACHES ACTIVE NEGOTIATION WITH EAST, HOWEVER, DANGER ARISES THAT WG ACTIVITIES COULD ABSORB ENERGIES NEEDED AT POLICY LEVEL WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING SUBSTANTIALLY TO DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE POSITIONS AND MIGHT ALSO SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR REOPENING DECISIONS ON ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND TACTICS ALREADY TAKEN AT POLICY LEVEL. ON BOTH PRACTICAL AND POLICY GROUNDS, THEREFORE, OUR NORMAL PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO RELY ON NATIONAL EXPERTISE FOR TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REQUIRED IN REACHING POLICY DECISIONS.

8. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO PRESS FOR ABOLITION OF WG GIVEN ALLIED VIEWS.

MANY EUROPEANS VALUE THE WG AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES OF NATIONAL EXPERTISE, AS VISIBLE SIGN OF FULL PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCE MBFR PREPARATIONS; AND AS PROTECTION AGAINST OPEN, TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON US FOR INFORMATION AND EVALUATION ON MBFR. AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, TO SEEK TO ABOLISH THE WG WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE FRICTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF KEEPING IT IN EXISTENCE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE PRACTICAL COURSE IS TO FIND MEANS OF MAKING BETTER USE OF THE INSTI-

TUTION AND MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLING ITS DISADVANTAGES.

9. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF TENDENCIES NOTED IN PARA 7 ABOVE  
APPEARS TO BE LACK OF SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND TASKS FOR THE  
WORKING GROUP FROM ITS PARENT ORGAN, THE COUNCIL. THE NEED  
IS FOR CLEAR AN

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